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Abstract
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) are the most common form of micronance in India. We
study the impact of collective actions undertaken by these groups, composed of women
only, on the variety of public goods the elected local authorities deal with. We provide
a simple model that suggests two hypotheses that we test and conrm using rst hand
data. The rst hypothesis states that local authorities provide a larger variety of public
goods when SHGs undertake collective actions, compared to a situation with exclusive
provision by the local authority. The second hypothesis states that local authorities
begin or increase the provision of public goods preferred by SHGs and that these might
include goods that exert a negative externality on other villagers. We provide evidence
of an important non-nancial benet of micronance: it provides a platform that
allows socially disadvantaged women to meet regularly and discuss problems. When
they undertake collective actions to solve those problems, these are recognized by the
local authorities. Problems that are closer to the needs of women seem to nd their
way into the political agenda.
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Self-Help Groups (SHGs) are the most common form of micronance in India. Their primary
aim is to help the poor to save and borrow: members pool their savings to create a common
fund and give out small loans to one another. SHGs can also open savings accounts and
apply for loans in commercial banks. In rural Orissa, where we conducted our survey, women
are relatively disadvantaged. They are restricted in their physical mobility, their public role
is minimal and access to information is limited. In such a context, SHGs also provide a
platform that allows women to meet regularly.
Economic theory suggests that repeated interaction between individuals can help building
social capital. Feigenberg et al. (2011) provide some experimental evidence of this. They
show that micronance clients are more likely to develop friendships and social ties if they
meet more frequently. However, they suggest that, since the scope of the meetings is nancial
intermediation, micronance mainly aects economic cooperation. We provide evidence that
cooperation can go beyond economic motives. We describe how SHG members undertake
collective actions aiming to solve problems aecting their villages.
A number of studies provide evidence that men and women have diverging preferences
for some public policies (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002). Still, in many
countries, women's preferences hardly nd their way into the political agendas. Some gov-
ernments have imposed political reservations in an attempt to bias policy choices in favor
of women. This proved to have a signicant impact (see, for instance, Chattopadhyay and
Duo (2004)). In our paper, we explore an alternative channel through which the preferences
of women can sway political decisions. We document how the collective actions undertaken
by SHGs inuence the variety of public goods the local authorities take care of.
The Gram Panchayat, the lowest ocial authority in rural India, consists of several
wards.1 A ward member is elected in each of those wards. He is the ocial spokesperson
of the villagers, in charge of informing the relevant ocers of the ward's problems and
needs. These issues should then be solved by the local government. The ward member is
the only ocial body with the duties described above. But other unocial bodies visit
functionaries on their own initiative. We distinguish between three dierent types of such
bodies: SHGs, Individuals and, as a residual category, Other Groups. Under this last label we
include dierent sorts of groups which meet regularly but for reasons dierent from nancial
intermediation. They mostly focus on specic activities like, for example, the protection of
1Wards can be dierent from villages: some villages have several wards and some wards consist of several
villages.
1forests.
The main focus of the paper is on SHGs. The SHGs we analyze were all created by an
NGO, PRADAN, without any intervention of the local governments. The programme has
no explicit socio-political agenda.2 In these respects, SHGs are dierent than Other Groups.
In our sample, 24.5% of Other Groups are created thanks to the direct intervention of an
ocer.
In September 2010, we conducted a survey to ask SHG members what kind of problems
they had faced in their ward and what they had done to solve them. Some groups merely
discussed problems during their meetings, but others undertook collective actions to tackle
them. These actions consisted either of a direct intervention or of a visit to an ocer to ask
for a solution. Our data shows that SHGs mainly focus on issues related to excessive alcohol
consumption, and forest and school problems.
We asked similar questions to ward members. Their main focus is on the major re-
sponsibilities of the Gram Panchayat: village infrastructure and welfare schemes. But we
provide evidence that the range of public goods ward members take care of is also inuenced
by the activities of SHGs: when SHGs are active, ward members are more likely to deal
with problems that are closer to the preferences of women. We propose a simple theoretical
explanation for this observation. In a political economy framework, we model the interac-
tion between the institutional public good provider (the ward member) and the SHGs. The
ward member maximizes the total welfare in his ward. But his ward is composed of a het-
erogeneous population, with possible conicting preferences over the types of public goods
that should be provided. The SHGs, after observing the behavior of the ward member, de-
cide whether or not to complement the ward member's provision by undertaking collective
actions. The model suggests some hypotheses that we test with an econometric analysis.
Our rst hypothesis states that collective actions by SHGs should lead the ward members
to provide a larger variety of public goods. Our second hypothesis states that the ward
members begin or increase the provision of public goods that SHGs prefer. These include
goods that exert a negative externality on other villagers. Both hypotheses are conrmed
by our empirical results. We nd that ward members deal with on average one extra type of
good after SHGs started undertaking actions. Moreover, the ward member is more likely to
deal with the topics SHGs are interested in: he is on average 28% more likely to deal with
alcohol issues, 25% more with forest issues and 22% more with school problems. There is no
2By contrast, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has a clear social development agenda. Members are
required to obey 16 Decisions which have a clear social connotation. For example, Decision 7 states: \We
shall educate our children and ensure that they can earn to pay for their education."
2signicant inuence on the probability of taking care of village infrastructures and welfare
schemes, the two main problems ward members already focus on.
Some of the extra problems the ward members deal with are related to public goods
that can exert a negative externality on subgroups of villagers. The best example is alcohol
production and consumption. It is not surprising that ward members were less likely to
deal with it before SHGs started undertaking collective actions. Most ward members are
men, and men are more likely to consume alcohol. They might also be reluctant to act
against their neighbors or friends, since they are an important part of their electorate. It
is worth remarking that, though SHGs have a positive inuence on the probability that
ward members deal with alcohol problems, the eect is stronger when the ward member is
a women.
Our work is related to dierent strands of the literature. The most closely related is the
approach suggested by Chowdhury et al. (2004). They discuss why, in evaluating the impact
of micronance programs, non-clients beneciaries ought to be considered. We follow a very
similar approach in describing how the behavior of SHGs can inuence the governance of
rural Indian communities.
There are also a growing number of works evaluating the social, non-nancial impact of
micronance. Many of them give special consideration to the role of women. Karlan and
Valdivia (2011) study the marginal impact of adding business training to a Peruvian group
lending program for female. Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega (2008), evaluate the inuence
of micronance programs on a rural household's demand for schooling. Pitt and Khandker
(1998) is one of the rst papers studying the impact of group based micronance on socio-
economic variables like, schooling, labor supply and intra-household distribution of resources.
One of their most interesting ndings is that participation in micronance programs has a
dierent impact on women and men.
Several authors study the incentives for private provision of public goods and propose
several theoretical explanations for the fact that people, in reality, are more active than what
theory predicts. Polborn (2008) emphasizes the role of reputation, whereas Andreoni (1989)
proposes impure altruism (warm glow). These dierent views have been recently reconciled
in a comprehensive model by B enabou and Tirole (2006). We do not model explicitly the
motives behind SHGs' actions, and we rather draw on the ndings of Feigenberg et al. (2011)
who provide evidence that the frequency of meetings is a determinant of long-run increases
in social interaction.
Our theoretical model is based on the framework proposed by Besley and Coate (2003),
that has also been applied by Besley et al. (2004) to Indian local governments. In its
3original formulation, the model studies the trade-o between centralization and decentral-
ization of public good provision. We modify this set-up by introducing private provision
by micronance groups: both SHGs and local government are active providers and interact
strategically to determine the type and the quantity of public goods to produce.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data set, the village
organization and the collective actions undertaken. In Section 3, we propose a simple model
suggesting the hypotheses that we test in Section 4. In Section 5 we conclude.
2 Background information
2.1 Data set
Data collection was assisted by our partner NGO, named PRADAN (Professional Assistance
for Development Action). It is specialized in the creation of SHGs, consisting of women
only, that it considers as an eective tool to strengthen the livelihood of socio-economically
disadvantaged people (PRADAN, 2005).
In 2006, Baland, Somanathan and Vandewalle surveyed all PRADAN SHGs created in
the Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar districts of Orissa (independent of whether the groups were
still actively meeting or not). They collected information on 532 SHGs and 8,599 women
who, at some point, belonged to these groups (Baland et al., 2008). In the autumn of
2010, we complemented this dataset in three ways. First, we revisited those SHGs to gather
information on the collective actions they undertook. Second, we did an elaborate village
survey to collect data on the activities of local authorities. As PRADAN started working
in Orissa in 1998 and as we need information dating back to the period before the creation
of the rst SHG, we interviewed the ward members elected in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007.3
We also recorded the activities of Other Groups and Individuals who visited ocers with
a particular request. Third, we obtained information on the female population in villages
from the Census of India 2001.
In total, we gathered information on 425 SHGs, 462 ward members, 94 Other Groups,
132 Individuals who visited ocers and 844 Individuals who never visited one, covering 112
villages and 147 wards.4
3Elections take place every 5 years. Ward members can be re-elected. They are replaced in case of death.
4We were not able to resurvey 72 SHGs and the villages in which they are located because of social
tensions created by a private mining rm. Another 35 groups that no longer meet were not willing to sit
with the research team.
42.2 Village structure
In rural India, the lowest ocial authority is the Gram Panchayat. It is composed by a group
of 5 to 15 contiguous villages. The 73rd Amendment Act 1992 of the Constitution of India
empowers the State Legislature \to endow the Panchayats with the power and authority
necessary to prepare the plans and implement the schemes for economic development and
social justice". The main responsibilities passed onto the Gram Panchayat are managing
local infrastructure and identifying villagers who are entitled to welfare schemes (Xaxa,
2010).
Each Gram Panchayat is divided into wards and is governed by one Sarpanch and several
ward members. One ward member (henceforth WM) is elected in each ward. WMs have
the right to access the records of the Gram Panchayat, to question any ocer about the
administration and to inspect the actions undertaken by the Gram Panchayat. They are
the spokesperson of the villagers who inform the Sarpanch about ward level problems or
needs. As the Gram Panchayat is mainly responsible for managing village infrastructures
and welfare schemes, these public goods are the main responsibility of the WMs too (Xaxa,
2010).
As described in the introduction, though SHGs are created for nancial intermediation,
we nd evidence that members also discuss non-nancial issues at their weekly meetings.
Moreover, they participate in collective actions aiming at the resolution of problems con-
cerning their ward. If they visit an ocer, they do not send a delegation but go as a group:
at the moment of the rst collective action, out of the on average 15 members, 11 are ac-
tively involved. WMs are usually aware of these actions. In our sample, 63.1% of the groups
informed the WM before they visited an ocer for the rst time.5
Other Groups consist of villagers who gather on average once a month, for a specic,
non-nancial reason. They are mainly forest committees (69.2%), some of which are created
by ocers of the forest department (35.4%).6 Other formed for village help (26.6%), cultural
activities (3.2%) and farming issues (1.0%). 90% of those which do not gather for forest issues
are created by neighbors. The remaining 10% were founded by an NGO. 59.6% of the wards
5The rst action mostly concerns village infrastructure (33.6%), forest issues (26.1%) and alcohol problems
(21.9%). See Section 6 for a description of the problems.
6As most villages are located close to the forest, households depend on it for cooking and as a source of
income (for example, an important source of income is making leaf plates). The increasing population rose
the pressure on the forest. To prevent excessive deforestation, villagers formed voluntary forest committees.
Later, the forest department started supporting existing committees and created new ones. They provide
training, supplies and introduce new ways of sustainable exploitation of the forest.
5have at least one Other Group.
We label as Individuals the villagers who visited an ocer on their own personal initia-
tive. They did not join any group, but dealt themselves with the issues they were interested
in. Although we might not have been able to identify all Individuals, we believe we inter-
viewed an important subset of them. Our main motivation to survey Individuals is being
able to tell them apart from villagers who joined either an SHG or an Other Group.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of WMs, members of SHGs, members of Other Groups
and Individuals who visited an ocer at least once (columns (1) to (4)). Other Groups
dier from SHGs in several respects. Their members have a quite dierent prole: they are
mainly men, are more educated and own more land. SHGs consist of women who did not
nish primary school (5 years of education) and whose households own about 1 acre less.
SHG members dier also from WMs and Individuals: the latter are better educated and
own more land. The percentage of female WMs is close to what we expect based on the
reservation of seats imposed by the Indian Law.7 Women rarely visit ocers alone (2.3%).
Table 1: Characteristics of WMs, members of SHGs, members of Other Groups and Individuals.
Bodies who visited ocer Bodies who did not visit ocer
Ward SHGs Other Individuals SHGs Other Individuals
members groups groups female male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# of groups N.A. 360 87 N.A. 65 7 N.A. N.A.
# of members 462 5,860 711 132 1,006 46 79 765
Woman (%) 31.0 100.0 13.4 2.3 100.0 15.2
Average education level (years) 6.8 2.7 7.5 9.0 1.7 8.1 3.3 4.8
Can read and write (%) 84.3 31.0 82.6 96.2 19.6 91.3 36.7 57.9
Land (acres) 2.4 1.6 2.6 3.3 1.8 3.2 2.6 1.8
Number of children 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.6 1.9 2.6
Age (years) 44.7 35.4 40.9 47.7 36.0 39.3 37.0 42.4
Caste category: ST (%) 72.4 62.4 66.7 64.4 76.9 71.7 77.2 66.7
Caste category: SC (%) 7.5 9.9 4.0 4.5 1.7 15.2 1.3 6.5
Caste category: OBC (%) 19.7 26.3 28.8 28.8 21.1 13.1 21.5 26.7
Caste category: FC (%) 0.4 1.4 0.5 2.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
The columns (5) to (8) show the characteristics of members of SHGs, members of Other
Groups and Individuals who never visited an ocer. To gather information on Individuals,
we interviewed in each village a random selection of people, who belong neither to an SHG
7One-third of the seats must be reserved for women. The reservation of seats is allotted by rotation of
the dierent wards (Xaxa, 2010).
6nor to an Other Group and who did not visit an ocer individually. We nd that SHG
members are slightly less educated in groups which never visited an ocer. The prole
of Other Group members is not much dierent among groups which visited an ocer and
groups which did not. Female Individuals are slightly more educated and own more land
than SHG members. We nd the opposite for male Individuals: they are less educated and
own less land than Other Group members and Individuals who visited an ocer.
2.3 Collective actions
We asked WMs, SHGs and Other Groups, which kind of public good problems they faced.
We also asked whether they discussed those problems within groups and whether they tried
to solve them by intervening directly or by visiting an ocer to ask for a solution. A brief
explanation of the dierent problems is given in the appendix (Section 6).
Table 2 shows, for each of the problems, the percentage of WMs, SHGs and Other Groups
that tried to solve it by visiting an ocer at least once (columns (1), (3) and (5) respectively).
The columns (2), (4) and (6) give the percentage of WMs, SHGs and Other Groups that
tried to solve a problem by either visiting an ocer or by intervening directly. The data
show that WMs and, except for forest issues, Other Groups are unlikely to intervene directly
in the village. If they deal with a particular problem, they mostly do it by visiting the ocer
in charge. SHGs instead, intervene directly for several issues. The most important ones are
alcohol and forest problems. Table 2 suggests several observations:
 As expected, WMs are most likely to deal with village infrastructure and welfare
schemes: these are the main responsibilities of the Gram Panchayat.
 Other Groups mainly deal with forest related issues. Note also that they mainly focus
on one specic topic: on average, they visit an ocer for only slightly more than one
public good.
 SHGs are most likely to tackle alcohol issues. Some groups visit an ocer to request
the suspension of alcohol licences. Other SHGs did not visit an ocer, but inter-
vened directly by organizing anti-alcohol campaigns or talking to alcohol-producing
households. This is quite interesting since anecdotal evidence suggests that women
considered alcohol consumption as a \right" of men. Therefore, they rarely undertook
legal actions, even in case of domestic violence or abuse. Still, even in villages where
women can drink, it is likely that the negative eects of excessive alcohol consumption
7Table 2: Public good activities of the WMs, SHGs and Other Groups
WMs SHGs Other Groups
% visit % visit or % visit % visit or % visit % visit or
ocer intervene ocer intervene ocer intervene
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Village infrastructure 79.0 79.9 43.3 53.7 31.9 36.2
Alcohol problems 12.3 13.0 33.7 59.8 6.4 7.5
Ration shops (pds) 4.8 5.6 11.5 15.1 0.0 1.1
School problems 12.1 12.3 9.9 16.5 4.3 6.4
Dowry and child marriage 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.8 0.0 1.1
Forest issues 33.1 33.1 35.3 55.1 69.2 74.5
Welfare schemes 63.9 63.9 2.1 2.1 0.0 1.1
Other 4.8 4.8 3.5 3.5 7.5 9.6
Average number of dierent issues 2.2 2.3 1.7 2.3 1.3 1.4
(conditional on at least one)
Number of observations 462 462 425 425 94 94
are discussed during group meetings. Women seem to recognize that alcohol con-
sumption can, for example, reduce the budget available for primary expenses (See, for
example, Mishra (1999)). Although, most likely, women were aware of alcohol related
problems before joining an SHG, we could not nd any woman undertaking actions
alone.
 SHGs also intervene for ration shops and school problems. This is in line with the
common nding that women generally spend more time and resources on family welfare
than men (See for instance Anderson and Baland (2002) and Bruce (1989)). School
problems are mainly related to low school quality.8 SHGs are also responsible for
providing midday meals at schools in 22% of the villages in our survey. They opened
a ration shop in 7% of the villages.
 SHG members also care about forest issues. They, for example, demand the protection
of forest, as many households' livelihood depends on it. Moreover, 29.7% of the groups
received training from PRADAN to improve their forest-based sources of income.
We want to understand whether public good actions of SHGs inuence the activities of
the WM. Unfortunately, we cannot measure changes in the productivity of WMs: we do not
8For example, a group requested the replacement of a teacher who was regularly absent because he had
to come from another village.
8know precisely how often each problem appeared, how often the WM tried to solve it and
how successful he was. But we do know the issues he tackles and this is what we exploit in
what follows.
As mentioned in the introduction, the main focus of the paper is on SHGs. The SHGs we
analyze were all created by the NGO PRADAN. To start the SHG programme, PRADAN
selects villages in administrative blocks with high levels of rural poverty. In Orissa, where
we conducted our study, there was no involvement of the government in this decision; and
there is no evidence that the government has ever opposed the creation of SHGs in any
of the selected villages. Furthermore, the SHG programme has no explicit socio-political
agenda. Therefore, we believe it is reasonable to assume that the creation of SHGs is not
inuenced by the elected WMs. This is not necessarily the case for Other Groups, as an
important subset of them is created thanks to interventions of government ocers and for
socio-political reasons. For completeness, we check whether the inclusion of Other Groups
in the empirical analysis changes the results (Section 4.5).
Table 3 shows, for each public good problem, the percentage of WMs who dealt with
it. What matters for our analysis is the timing of the WM's mandate as compared to the
creation and evolution of SHGs. Thus, we rst classify WMs depending on whether their
mandate nished before the rst SHG was created in the ward (column (1)) or after (column
(2)). These simple descriptive statistics document a sharp increase for most of the problems.
This preliminary analysis can be slightly rened by taking into account that SHGs do not
visit ocers from the very start of their existence. As described in the introduction, SHGs
are created for nancial intermediation, and not for public good provision. For this reason,
on average, they visit an ocer for the rst time after about two years of weekly meetings.9
Thus, if the activities of the WMs are inuenced by the collective actions of SHGs, we might
observe a change only when SHGs start showing interest. In other words, the mere creation
of an SHG might not matter. For this reason, we further split the time frame after the
9Mishra (1999) describes the process towards other forms of cooperation (within SHGs) as a three-stage
evolution over time. In the rst stage, group members have a minimum level of awareness and have to shed
their prejudices. In the next stage, the critical/normative one, groups may experience pressure from both
outside and inside. That helps the emergence of a group leader and shapes internal norms. Groups reach
the third stage when they have an agreement about the group's objective. They start functioning as a team,
notice common problems or issues and act collectively irrespective of whether it is an economic or a social
one. Therefore, we can assume that groups do not deal with elaborated non-nancial issues before they
reached a minimum level of nancial stability. A purpose of SHGs is to be linked with a commercial bank.
On average, groups receive their rst bank loan after 20 months of weekly meetings only.
9creation of SHGs. We report the percentage of WMs who dealt with a problem depending
on whether his mandate nished after the creation of the rst SHG but before an SHG
visited an ocer in his ward (column (3)) or after the rst SHG visited an ocer (column
(4)). For most issues, we observe an increase after the creation of the rst SHG in the ward,
but the main increase occurs after a rst SHG went to visit an ocer.
Table 3: Public good activities of the WMs, before and after the start of SHGs
% of WMs visiting an ocer
Creation Creation vs being active
Before the After the After the Since
creation creation creation SHGs visit
of SHGs of SHGs of SHGs ocers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Village infrastructure 72.1 81.7 75.8 84.0
Alcohol problems 2.3 16.2 1.1 22.3
Ration shops (pds) 0.8 6.3 1.1 8.4
School problems 5.4 14.7 1.1 20.2
Dowry and child marriage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Forest issues 21.7 37.5 17.9 45.4
Welfare schemes 35.7 74.8 62.1 79.8
Other 3.1 5.4 4.2 5.9
Average number of dierent issues 1.7 2.4 1.8 2.7
(conditional on at least one)
Table 2 and 3 suggest that SHGs inuence the behavior of WMs with their actions. In
Section 3, we provide an intuitive explanation of why WMs might deal with problems that
go beyond their main responsibility. We believe it to be a strategic response to the collective
actions of SHGs. Our model suggests two hypotheses that we test in Section 4.
3 The model
We propose a simple model to provide an intuitive explanation of the phenomena described
by our data. We want to understand why and if WMs have incentives to provide a dierent
set of public goods as a response to the collective actions of SHGs. We model the decision
10process of WMs and SHGs to check whether our conjecture makes economic sense. We then
test our prediction with a careful econometric analysis. The model we propose is close to
the ones of Besley and Coate (2003) and Besley et al. (2004).
Suppose there are two dierent types of villagers (1 and 2) and that the public goods
can be classied in two dierent categories, also labeled with 1 and 2. Let g1 and g2 be
the number of public goods of type 1 and 2 respectively. A villager of type i has a (weak)
preference for goods of type i, with i 2 f1;2g, but also benets/suers an externality induced
by goods of type  i. This is described by the following utility function:
Ui(g1;g2;i) = log(gi) + i log(g i)
where i 2 [ 1;1] denotes the level of externality that good  i generates for type i. When
i > 0 the externality is positive, whereas it is negative when i < 0. Without loss of
generality, we can think of villagers of type 1 as being men and public goods 1 as being
goods men are particularly interested in. Hence, villagers of type 2 are women.
We solve two dierent specications of the model. In the basic set-up, we model the
situation before the SHG programme started in the ward: the WM is the only public good
provider.10 Next, we enrich the model with an SHG that can undertake collective actions to
provide public goods. Since SHGs consist of women, only type 2 villagers can form a group.
We consider the decision to form an SHG as exogenous and for simplicity we assume that
all women belong to it. In these wards, public goods can be provided by both the WM and
the SHG. We model the competitive interaction between these two players in a sequential
way. We assume that a WM can provide a total number of goods T 2 [0;Tmax] by incurring
a total linear cost kT, with k > 0. T can be interpreted as the time spent addressing ward
problems, or as the total amount of resources available to the WM. The SHG incurs a cost
c per unit provided, with c > 0.11
3.1 Basic set-up
We rst model a situation in which the WM is the only public good provider. The WM
chooses the total number of public goods T to provide and how to allocate it between g1 and
g2. Let g = (g1;g2) and  = (1;2). We assume he maximizes, in two steps, the following
10For simplicity and without loss of generality we do not consider public good provision by single villagers.
11The assumption that WMs and SHGs incur linear costs are taken for the ease of exposition. Assuming




W(T;g;;) =U1(g;1) + (1   )U2(g;2)   kT
s:t: : g1 + g2 = T
T  Tmax
gi  0 i = 1;2
where  2 [0;1]. The WM maximizes the weighted sum of the utilities of both types of
users, subject to its budget constraint and a non-negativity constraint for gi. We consider
the weight  as an exogenous variable that can be interpreted in dierent ways: a value of
 > 1=2 can describe a WM biased towards type 1 villagers, for example because he is a
type 1 himself;  can also represent the proportion of type 1 villagers, or can be the result of
a decision process maximizing the probability of the WM being reelected. Thus, the model
applies also to situations in which the WM is not fully benevolent.
We rst determine the optimal allocation g1 and g2 for any given T, and then we deter-
mine the optimal T. The results are summarized in the next proposition.
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Note that ^ g2 is decreasing in , whereas ^ g1 is increasing. This is intuitive: when type 2
villagers have less importance for the WM, a smaller amount of resources is devoted to the
provision of their favorite goods. Moreover, when 1 < 2, ^ T is decreasing in . If type 2
goods generate a smaller spillover on type 1 villagers, the WM provides a smaller number of
public goods as  increases. The decrease of ^ g2 is larger than the increase of ^ g1, so that ^ T
decreases.
The solution shows that, as negative externalities between the two types of public goods
are possible, there are situations in which the WM decides not to provide one type of goods.
To see that, consider g2 and note that ^ g2 = 0 if 1 
 1
 . Since  2 [0;1], this condition
implies that goods g2 will not be provided if 1 is negative and suciently small. A similar
condition applies for ^ g1. In case of negative externalities, the WM trades o the benet a
public good produces on one type of villagers with the disutility it creates for the other type.
When the disutility outweighs the benet, the WM prefers not to provide it at all.
12If goods of type 2 are not provided (or under-provided), the SHG, which we assumed to
be of type 2 villagers, can have incentives to take care of their provision. This is what we
model in the next subsection.
3.2 Private and public provision
The SHG provides g2c goods of type 2 to complement the WM's provision. Actions are taken
sequentially with the following timing:
 t = 1: The WM chooses the optimal T and how to allocate it between g1 and g2
 t = 2: The SHG observes g1 and g2 and chooses g2c
Our choice of the timing stems from the observation of the relationship between WMs
and SHGs. First, note that WMs provided public goods well before the start of the SHG
programme. More importantly, as described in Section 2.2, 64% of the groups contacted the
WM before undertaking their rst action. Thus, the WM is aware of the fact that SHGs are
active and, as a rst mover, can modify his behavior taking into account the reaction of the
SHGs.12
We calculate the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium by backward induction. Hence, we
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Since the best-reaction function depends on g2 only, we denote it with the shorter no-
tation g2c(g2). The WM's maximization problem is similar to the one explained in the
12In this type of sequential model, the rst mover strategy has the value of a strong commitment. We
believe it is more natural to expect such a commitment from the WMs, since they are elected and are
institutionally assigned the task to take care of ward problems. The interest in a particular type of ward
problem can, for instance, be declared in the local electoral campaign. The SHGs are created for a dierent
reason, so that it is more realistic to think their provision as a reaction to the observation of the WM's
strategy. Moreover, since g2 and g2c are substitutes, the rst mover has a competitive advantage that ts
better to the role of the WM.
13previous subsection. But now the WM takes into account the reaction of the SHG. Let
g = (g1;g2;g2c(g2)) and  = (1;2). The WM maximizes the following function:
max
T;g1;g2
W(T;g;;) =U1(g;) + (1   )U
c
2(g;)   kT
s:t: : g1 + g2 = T
T  Tmax
gi  0 i = 1;2
This formulation leads to a particularly simple solution. By replacing g2c(g2) and the
budget constraint into the objective function we get:
W(T;g;;) = [log(g1)+1 log(1=c)]+(1 )[log(1=c)+2 log(g1) c(1=c (T  g1))] kT
The WM rst chooses the optimal g1 and g2 for any given T. It can be easily calculated
that:
g1 =
2(1   ) + 
c(1   )
g2(T) = T  
2(1   ) + 
c(1   )
that depend only on 2. In fact, 1 becomes irrelevant since the action of the SHG no longer
allows the WM to control the externality that g2 exerts on type 1 villagers. Intuitively, if
the SHG provides goods of type 2, the externality generated by 1 cannot be avoided, no
matters what the WM does. We can replace g2 into g2c(g2) and calculate the optimal choice
of the SHG:
g2c =
2(1   ) + 1   cT(1   )
c(1   )
Because of equation (1), it is clear that g2c = 0 whenever g2  1=c. Noting that the objective
function is linear in T, we get the following results:
Proposition 2. Suppose that c(1 )  k. Then, in the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
of the sequential game, the WM sets g
1, g
2 and T :
g

















2(1   ) + 1   cTmax(1   )
c(1   )

If c(1   ) < k, the WM sets T  = g
1 = g1, g
2 = 0 and g
2c = 1
c.13
13When c(1   ) = k the WM gets the same utility for any T, so there is a continuum of equilibria. For
simplicity, for this very special case, we select the welfare maximizing one.
14The condition c(1   ) > k implies that the marginal cost of provision borne by SHG
members should be bigger than the marginal cost faced by the WM.14 The condition is
required to ensure that the WM's objective function has a positive slope. Since W(T;g;;)
is linear in T, when c(1   ) > k, the WM sets T as high as possible, namely T = Tmax.
This is because he internalizes the cost borne by the SHG and prefers to take care of the
provision himself at a lower marginal cost. When instead c(1   ) < k, the WM prefers to
free ride letting the SHG provide goods of type 2.
Note that g
1 is increasing in , whereas g
2 is decreasing. Since, by equation (1) the total
number of type 2 goods is 1=c, g2c is increasing in : the provisions of the WM and of the
SHG are substitutes. This is intuitive: when  is large, the WM prefers to provide a smaller
number of type 2 goods. Therefore, the SHG provides them itself.
These results allow us to shed some light on the role that the SHG plays in the public
good provision. It is particularly interesting to compare the provision of type 2 goods. It
can be easily veried that when c takes intermediate values, then g
2 > ^ g2, i.e. the WM's
provision of g2 is larger in the joint provision model.
Proposition 3. There exists an interval [c;c] and a k  0 such that for any c 2 [c;c] and
for any k < k < c(1   ), g
2 > ^ g2, i.e. the WM provides a larger number of public goods of
type 2 when the SHG is active.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The value of k is dened in Appendix B. Intuitively, if g2 is low, the SHG has an incentive
to provide the good at a cost cg2c. Since this cost has a negative inuence on the welfare
function, the WM tries to reduce it by providing part of the good himself. As the marginal




2c = 0. This is illustrated in Figure 1. When c is too large, the activities of the SHG can
become wasteful, so that the exclusive provision by the WM is more ecient. However, when
1 
 1
 , ^ g2 is equal to zero, so that the continuous horizontal line in Figure 1 corresponds
to the horizontal axis. In this case, the upper bound c goes to innity. The result holds for
k large enough (k > k). In fact, if the marginal cost of provision is very low, the WM can
always do better than the SHG.
Finally, note that in the sequential model, if c(1   ) > k, the WM sets a (weakly)
larger value of T: our model predicts that, when the SHG is an active public good provider,
14We believe that this condition ts well the situation we are describing. In rural India, social actions
have a larger cost for women (see also the previous section for a wider discussion).














the WM takes care of a larger number of village issues. To understand why, we report the
following simple result:
Proposition 4. (i) Suppose c(1   ) > k. Then g
1 < ^ g1, i.e. the WM provides a smaller
number of public goods of type 1 when the SHG is active. (ii) Moreover, for any k 2
[~ k;c(1   )] and for any c > 0, jg
1   ^ g1j < jg
2   ^ g2j.
Proof. See Appendix B
The value ~ k is dened in Appendix B. The result shows that there is some substitution
between goods of type 1 and 2. When k is very small, the WM can provide a large number
of public goods in the basic set up: ^ g1 and ^ g2 increase as k decreases. Conversely, g
1 does
not depend on k. For this reason, for small values of k, the WM provides a smaller number
of type 1 goods when the SHG is active (point (i)).
Point (ii) states that for some values of k, the increase of g
2 is not completely oset by
the decrease of g
1. This is possible thanks to the increase of T. In fact, note that jg
1   ^ g1j
is decreasing in k, whereas jg
2   ^ g2j is increasing. Under the assumptions in point (i) and in
proposition 3, g
2 > ^ g2, so that as k increases, ^ g2 decreases and the gap widens; the opposite
happens for g1, as g
1 < ^ g1. So, when k is large enough (k > ~ k), the presence of an SHG has
a larger impact on type 2 than on type 1 goods.
163.3 Discussion
The model suggests some simple hypotheses that we test in Section 4.
-Hypothesis 1: The active presence of an SHG leads to an increase in the overall public good
provision by the WM, as measured by a larger variety of goods.
-Hypothesis 2: The WM begins or increases the provision of public goods preferred by the
SHG (g
2 > ^ g2). These include public goods that exert a negative externality on other
villagers (1 < 0). The increase in type 2 goods is not oset by a decrease of type 1 goods.
Hypothesis 1 is related to two ndings of our model. First, when the SHG is active there
is an increase in the total number of public goods provided by the WM. Second, both types
of goods are provided in a positive quantity. Exclusive provision by the WM, instead, can
lead to no provision of one of the goods (goods 2 in our model). The extra public goods the
WM deals with are the goods that are also provided by the SHG (goods 2 in our model).
These goods can exert a negative externality on other villagers (hypothesis 2).
Our results depend on the size of the marginal costs of provision. Although it is hard
to estimate the marginal cost of undertaking collective actions, we believe our conditions
are reasonable given the phenomena we are describing. The provision has an important
psychological cost for SHG members. As described in the introduction, women are restricted
in their physical mobility and public voice in the region where we did our survey.15 Although
visiting an ocer is not necessarily expensive, it can require a substantial amount of time.
Moreover, as most of the SHGs take actions as a group, they also exert a signicant eort
in the organization. For these reasons, we believe that the marginal cost faced by SHGs is
substantially larger than the one faced by WMs (c(1 ) > k). Still, WMs are not full-time
government employees: they have another activity as primary occupation. Thus, also for
them, the cost of provision k is not negligible.
4 Empirical strategy and results
In this section, we test the hypotheses suggested by our model. Hypothesis 1 is tested in
Section 4.1 and hypothesis 2 in Section 4.2. We discuss the role of SHGs in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.4 we argue that our results are not spurious by showing that WM characteristics
15Indeed, we found evidence that women rarely visit an ocer alone (cfr. Table 1).
17do not predict an SHG becoming active. Finally, we provide robustness checks in Section
4.5.
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Number of issues discussed by the WM
To test whether the active presence of SHGs leads to an increase in the overall public good
provision by WMs, we measure the impact of SHGs on the number of dierent problems the
WM visited an ocer for. Using OLS, we estimate the following regression:
yij = Aij + Gij + Tij + j + ij (2)
where yij is the total number of dierent issues discussed by WM i in ward j. Aij consists
of two dummies included to compare the activities of WMs operating before an SHG was
created to those operating after. We investigate whether the increase in public good provision
that we observe in the data, results from either SHGs showing interest in collective actions
or their creation itself. Thus, we distinguish between WMs whose mandate nished before
SHGs started visiting ocers and WMs whose mandate nished after the rst SHG went:
 SHG created = 1 if an SHG is created in the ward
 SHG active = 1 if an SHG visited an ocer in the ward
Gij is a set of controls describing the WMs' characteristics. It includes the education
level, the land ownership, the total number of children, age, caste category and a dummy
indicating whether the WM is a man.16 Tij is a set of dummies included to control for the
year in which the WM was elected (elected in '97, '02 or '07). The omitted category is
elected in '92. We include these dummies to control for a possible trend, as the quality of
the WMs might increase over time. Finally, j is a ward xed eect and ij is the error term.
The dummy SHG active might potentially be endogenous as, for instance, a WM par-
ticularly sensitive to women issues might encourage SHGs to become active. As discussed
before, we consider the creation of SHGs as a plausible exogenous event. Therefore, we also
run the regression taking into account the creation of SHGs only.
Table 4 shows, by year of election, the percentage of WMs during whose mandate SHGs
were present and/or active. SHGs were mainly created during the mandate of WMs elected
in 1997 and 2002, and they mainly started visiting ocers during the mandate of WMs
elected in 2002 and 2007. Note that, by 2007 all wards had at least one SHG.
16Castes are classied in the following categories: ST (scheduled tribe), SC (scheduled caste), OBC (other
backward caste) and FC (forward caste).
18Table 4: Percentage of WMs during whose mandate SHGs were present and/or active (by election
year)
Elected in
1992 1997 2002 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CREATION OF SHGs VERSUS SHGs BEING ACTIVE
Non-active SHGs present (%) 3.2 30.5 33.3 9.5
Active SHGs present (%) 6.5 19.9 66.7 90.5
CREATION OF SHGs
SHG groups present (%) 9.7 50.4 100.0 100.0
Average number of issues discussed by WMs 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.7
The results of our regressions are given in Table 5. Column (1) and (3) do not include
the trend, while column (2) and (4) do. First, we take into account the creation of SHGs
only (column (1) and (2)). Next, we dierentiate between WMs whose mandate nished
before or after an SHG visited an ocer for the rst time (column (3) and (4)).
The creation of an SHG inuences positively the number of problems WMs deal with.
As expected, when we use both the dummies SHG created and SHG active, only the latter is
signicant and the estimated impact (about 1.2 extra issues) is larger. These results conrm
our rst hypothesis: the active presence of SHGs leads to an increase of the overall public
good provision by the WM, as measured by a larger variety of goods. We also nd that male
WMs deal with fewer issues and so do those who own more land.
4.1.1 A Political Economy Explanation
We want to explore a complementary explanation. Since WMs are democratically elected,
we can expect the impact of SHGs to be stronger when the number of SHG members is
larger.
To check this explanation, we construct two dierent variables measuring the electoral
weight of SHGs. The rst variable, SHG members per ward counts, for each ward and each
WM, the maximum number of women who belonged to SHGs for at least one day of the
mandate. Ideally, we would like to divide this number by the voting female population in
the ward. Unfortunately we do not have this information. The Census of India provides
only the number of female above 6 per village. Since there is no one-to-one correspondence
between villages and wards (some villages have several wards and some wards consist of
several villages), we construct a second variable, SHG members per village. It measures,
19Table 5: Total number of ward problems addressed by the WMs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SHG created 0.9032*** 0.5989*** 0.2174 0.2322
(0.1239) (0.2003) (0.1432) (0.1933)
SHG active 1.2255*** 1.1662***
(0.1300) (0.2162)
Male -0.2958** -0.3025** -0.3278** -0.3359**
(0.1449) (0.1442) (0.1288) (0.1337)
Education level (years) 0.0265 0.0248 0.0264 0.0246
(0.0201) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0193)
Land (acres) -0.0452*** -0.0422*** -0.0416*** -0.0407***
(0.0116) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Number of children -0.0184 -0.0153 -0.0105 -0.0119
(0.0349) (0.0336) (0.0341) (0.0332)
Age 0.0105 0.0493 0.0481* 0.0578*
(0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0288) (0.0296)
Squared age -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Caste category: SC -0.0474 -0.1185 0.0032 -0.0404
(0.2223) (0.2196) (0.2257) (0.2221)
Caste category: OBC/FC 0.0550 0.0583 0.1067 0.0979
(0.1693) (0.1657) (0.1612) (0.1623)
Elected in '97 0.0527 0.0535
(0.1583) (0.1506)
Elected in '02 0.2624 -0.0058
(0.2391) (0.2282)
Elected in '07 0.6459*** 0.1784
(0.2424) (0.2431)
Constant 1.4108 0.2963 0.4178 0.1355
(0.8561) (0.8415) (0.7329) (0.7540)
Ward xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 448 448 448 448
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
20Table 6: Political Economics Variables
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
SHG members per ward 30 0 135
SHG members per village 0.15 0 1
SHG members per ward conditional on SHG being created 43 9 135
SHG members per village conditional on SHG being created 0.22 0.023 1
for each village and each WM, the maximum number of women who belonged to SHGs for
at least one day of the mandate, as a percentage of the female population above 6. This
measure relies on the assumption that the distribution of women over age is comparable
across villages and constant over time. The variables are summarized in Table 6.
The results, when we use these independent variables instead of the variable SHG created
in column (2) of Table 5, are shown in Table 7. The variables of interest have a positive and
signicant coecient, suggesting that a larger number of SHG members might correspond
to a wider set of problems WMs feel responsible for. The average impact is comparable to
what we found in column (2) of Table 5: for SHG members per ward, we nd the increase is
about 0.46 (0.010843) and for SHG members per village about 0.5 (2.25720.22).
4.2 Hypothesis 2: Extra issues discussed by the WM
Table 5 shows that WMs deal with a larger variety of ward problems as a response to actions
of SHGs. We now want to examine which are the extra issues generating this increase. To
do that, we adapt regression (2) and run the following OLS regressions:
yijt = Aij + Gij + Tij + j + ijt (3)
where yijt is a dummy equal to one if WM i in ward j visited an ocer for issue t.
Table 8 shows the results when we only take into account the creation of SHGs. In Table
9 we dierentiate between creation and becoming active.
Table 8 shows that the probability that WMs visit ocers for alcohol and school prob-
lems increases by about 10%. For forest issues, the increase is about 13%. There is no
signicant impact on village infrastructure and welfare schemes, which are the two main
responsibilities of the WMs. The results are qualitatively similar when we also consider the
dummy SHG active (Table 9). The creation of SHGs is no longer signicant, but their rst
action makes WMs on average 28% more likely to visit an ocer for alcohol, 22% for school
21Table 7: Total number of ward problems addressed by WMs
SHG members per ward (#) 0.0108***
(0.0031)
SHG members per village 2.2572***
(% of female population) (0.5541)
Male -0.3017** -0.3058**
(0.1423) (0.1454)
Education level (years) 0.0294 0.0307
(0.0209) (0.0212)
Land (acres) -0.0462*** -0.0469***
(0.0099) (0.0106)




Squared age -0.0005* -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Caste category: SC -0.0686 -0.0121
(0.2227) (0.2157)
Caste category: OBC/FC 0.0468 -0.0083
(0.1629) (0.1666)
Elected in '97 0.1505 0.1576
(0.1343) (0.1312)
Elected in '02 0.2935 0.2704
(0.2078) (0.1977)




Ward xed eects yes yes
N 448 439
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
22Table 8: Probability, per problem, of WM visiting an ocer (creation only)
Alcohol School Ration Forest Village Welfare
issues issues shop issues infrastructure scheme
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SHG created 0.0973* 0.1034* 0.0022 0.1343* 0.0842 0.1416
(0.0567) (0.0551) (0.0322) (0.0699) (0.0858) (0.0891)
Male -0.1035** -0.0679 0.0085 -0.0517 0.0691 -0.1564***
(0.0421) (0.0444) (0.0281) (0.0445) (0.0541) (0.0504)
Education level (years) 0.0117* -0.0003 -0.0045 -0.0063 0.0089 0.0115
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0076)
Land (acres) -0.0089 -0.0104*** -0.0005 -0.0078 -0.0109 -0.0022
(0.0081) (0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0048)
Number of children -0.0129 0.0065 0.0017 -0.0028 -0.0255 0.0135
(0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0073) (0.0131) (0.0177) (0.0141)
Age -0.0022 0.0051 0.0017 0.0021 0.0209 0.0235*
(0.0116) (0.0085) (0.0062) (0.0100) (0.0152) (0.0121)
Squared age 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Caste category: SC -0.0731 0.0544 0.0198 -0.1458* -0.0933 0.1421
(0.0586) (0.0734) (0.0428) (0.0744) (0.0940) (0.1063)
Caste category: OBC/FC -0.1356** 0.0720 0.0508 -0.0427 -0.0225 0.1678***
(0.0574) (0.0450) (0.0348) (0.0461) (0.0491) (0.0615)
Elected in '97 0.0383 -0.0634 -0.0078 0.0214 0.0120 0.0390
(0.0355) (0.0438) (0.0230) (0.0456) (0.0790) (0.0686)
Elected in '02 0.0730 -0.0675 0.0289 0.0756 0.0231 0.1446
(0.0671) (0.0639) (0.0403) (0.0783) (0.1060) (0.1060)
Elected in '07 0.0617 0.1133* 0.0834** 0.1101 -0.0440 0.2957***
(0.0670) (0.0679) (0.0411) (0.0751) (0.1049) (0.1050)
Constant 0.0750 -0.0825 -0.0342 0.2814 0.2079 -0.1583
(0.3037) (0.2403) (0.1539) (0.2759) (0.3769) (0.3381)
Ward xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 448 448 448 448 448 448
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
23Table 9: Probability, per problem, of WM visiting an ocer (creation vs activity)
Alcohol School Ration Forest Village Welfare
issues issues shop issues infrastructure scheme
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SHG created -0.0224 0.0263 -0.0310 0.0627 0.0685 0.0958
(0.0580) (0.0486) (0.0379) (0.0757) (0.0822) (0.0889)
SHG active 0.2824*** 0.2227*** 0.0536 0.2451*** 0.1084 0.2126**
(0.0668) (0.0728) (0.0335) (0.0706) (0.1079) (0.1060)
Male -0.1144*** -0.0750* 0.0054 -0.0582 0.0676 -0.1606***
(0.0382) (0.0430) (0.0278) (0.0432) (0.0546) (0.0502)
Education level (years) 0.0117** -0.0004 -0.0045 -0.0064 0.0089 0.0114
(0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0042) (0.0072) (0.0081) (0.0076)
Land (acres) -0.0084 -0.0101*** -0.0003 -0.0075 -0.0109 -0.0020
(0.0074) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0072) (0.0069) (0.0050)
Number of children -0.0118 0.0073 0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0253 0.0139
(0.0080) (0.0091) (0.0072) (0.0128) (0.0178) (0.0142)
Age 0.0006 0.0069 0.0025 0.0038 0.0213 0.0246**
(0.0101) (0.0087) (0.0065) (0.0093) (0.0151) (0.0120)
Squared age 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Caste category: SC -0.0476 0.0708 0.0269 -0.1306* -0.0900 0.1519
(0.0583) (0.0724) (0.0434) (0.0760) (0.0940) (0.1078)
Caste category: OBC/FC -0.1226** 0.0803* 0.0544 -0.0350 -0.0208 0.1727***
(0.0533) (0.0427) (0.0353) (0.0445) (0.0494) (0.0622)
Elected in '97 0.0386 -0.0633 -0.0078 0.0216 0.0120 0.0391
(0.0338) (0.0434) (0.0230) (0.0428) (0.0789) (0.0691)
Elected in '02 -0.0145 -0.1239** 0.0046 0.0232 0.0116 0.1111
(0.0634) (0.0618) (0.0368) (0.0714) (0.1121) (0.1123)
Elected in '07 -0.0908 0.0150 0.0411 0.0188 -0.0640 0.2372**
(0.0658) (0.0690) (0.0361) (0.0716) (0.1159) (0.1184)
Constant 0.0225 -0.1164 -0.0487 0.2500 0.2010 -0.1784
(0.2665) (0.2429) (0.1592) (0.2612) (0.3760) (0.3377)
Ward xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 448 448 448 448 448 448
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
24problems and 25% for forest issues. Furthermore, we do observe a signicant impact for
welfare schemes now. Interestingly, male WMs are less likely to take care of alcohol issues
and welfare schemes.
In conclusion, the estimates suggest that SHGs inuence WMs for the public goods they
are interested in (see Section 2.2). Hypothesis 2 also states that some of the public goods
preferred by SHGs might exert a negative externality on other villagers. As described in the
introduction, the best example of a controversial issue is probably alcohol production and
consumption.
4.3 The role of SHGs in the provision of public goods
In the previous sections, we found that WMs are more likely to deal with issues beyond
their main responsibility when SHGs are active. This observation leads to the following two
questions. First, given that villagers are interested in these public goods, why did WMs not
deal with them before SHGs became active or were created? Second, why do WMs start
dealing with those issues and do not let SHGs tackle the problems themselves?
A possible answer to the rst question is that women, due to their lack of organization,
fail to communicate their interest in public goods to the WM. Consider for example alcohol
issues. Even if a woman realizes there is a problem, she is unlikely to tackle it alone. The
SHG provides an opportunity to express her aversion and, supported by other members, to
inform the WM.17
Our theoretical model suggests an answer to the second question: when SHGs show
interest in public good provision, WMs take into account the additional cost they have
to bear. In order to reduce this burden, the WM provides part of the good. A possible
motivation to do so, is increasing his reputation in the ward and therefore the probability
of being reelected. Indeed, in Section 4.1.1 we showed that the impact of SHGs is stronger
when the number of women who participate in SHGs is larger.
4.4 Selection
By providing support and reducing the (psychological) cost of actions, WMs particularly
sensitive to women's issues might induce SHGs to become active. In that case, the results,
when using both the dummies for creation and for activity, would be spurious: if WMs any-
17A more precise answer to this question would admittedly require more investigation, but that is beyond
the scope of this paper.
25how become receptive to a wider range of issues, the regressions might be capturing political
trends only. In order to exclude this possibility, we check whether WM characteristics pre-
dict an SHG becoming active. An insignicant impact validates the approach we followed
in the previous subsections.18
For WM i in ward j, the dummy activeij equals one if the rst SHG became active during
his mandate, and zero if no SHG was active. We estimate the following linear probability
model:
activeij = issues(i 1)j + Gij + Tij + j + ij (4)
issues(i 1)j is the number of issues discussed by the previous WM in ward j. Gij is a set of
controls for WM i, Tij is a set of dummies included to control for the year in which the WM
was elected, j is a ward xed eect and ij the error term. The results are given in Table
10.
In column (1), we do not include the trend. In this case, an SHG becoming active is
signicantly and positively correlated with the number of issues discussed by the previous
WM. But as we add the trend (column (2)), the correlation is no longer signicant. Moreover,
we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the coecients for the WM characteristics are
zero (p-value = 0.33). Therefore, after controlling for ward heterogeneity and time trend,
the event SHGs becoming active is uncorrelated with both the activities of the previous WM
and demographics. As expected, we obtain similar results by using a more demanding ward
specic linear trend instead of the aggregate trend dummies (column (3)).
4.5 Robustness checks
First, although we did not nd evidence of selection after including election year dummies,
we examine whether our results are also robust to the inclusion of ward-level linear trends.
It allows us to control better for a ward specic evolution over time. Second, we take into
account that, apart from SHGs, Other Groups were created in a subset of wards. Thus far,
we did not focus on those groups, as their creation might be endogenous. But, as we do
not want the coecients of SHG created and SHG active to pick up the potential inuence
of those Other Groups, we test whether our results still hold when we do take them into
account.
18The discussion in this subsection is based on DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007).
26Table 10: Selection
(1) (2) (3)
Number of issues discussed 0.1404* -0.0614 -0.1433
by previous WM (0.0725) (0.0459) (0.2997)
Male 0.3069** 0.1574* 0.0473
(0.1262) (0.0848) (0.3571)
Education level (years) -0.0067 -0.0051 0.0188
(0.0198) (0.0147) (0.0548)
Land (acres) -0.0491 -0.0164 -0.0120
(0.0304) (0.0213) (0.0594)
Number of children -0.0451 -0.0349 0.0047
(0.0378) (0.0255) (0.1396)
Age -0.0569 0.0005 -0.1097
(0.0345) (0.0202) (0.1234)
Squared age 0.0005 0.0000 0.0014
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0012)
Caste category: SC -0.3893 -0.2815 -0.8382*
(0.2494) (0.2268) (0.4806)
Caste category: OBC/FC -0.2290 -0.1126 -0.1155
(0.1505) (0.0958) (0.5322)
Elected in '97 -1.0097***
(0.1003)
Elected in '02 -0.5082***
(0.0874)
Elected in '07 0.0000
(0.0000)
Constant 2.0057** 1.2070** 1.3416
(0.7748) (0.4789) (3.2778)
Ward xed eects yes yes yes
Ward linear trend no no yes
N 219 219 219
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
274.5.1 A ward-level linear trend
We replace the election year dummies by ward-level linear trends. The results are given in
Table 11. For the total number of issues WMs deal with (column (1)), the estimated impact
Table 11: Robustness check: Using a ward linear trend
Total # of Alcohol School Ration Forest Village Welfare
issues issues issues shop issues infrastructure schemes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SHG created -0.0568 0.0389 -0.1443 -0.0194 0.0800 0.0336 -0.0387
(0.3148) (0.1126) (0.1108) (0.0525) (0.1149) (0.1382) (0.1536)
SHG active 0.8389* 0.3625** 0.0390 0.0518 0.2592* 0.0600 0.0572
(0.4279) (0.1565) (0.1737) (0.0753) (0.1530) (0.1807) (0.2100)
Male -0.2941 -0.1115 -0.0417 -0.0113 -0.0689 0.0901 -0.1629
(0.2474) (0.0740) (0.0813) (0.0459) (0.0785) (0.1082) (0.1135)
Education level (years) 0.0248 0.0083 0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0044 0.0152
(0.0433) (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0087) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0174)
Land (acres) -0.0173 -0.0137 0.0010 -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0039 0.0034
(0.0259) (0.0120) (0.0103) (0.0042) (0.0183) (0.0164) (0.0104)
Number of children -0.0395 -0.0061 0.0047 -0.0056 0.0116 -0.0574 0.0094
(0.0822) (0.0249) (0.0205) (0.0181) (0.0298) (0.0415) (0.0414)
Age 0.0612 0.0032 0.0141 0.0025 -0.0122 0.0310 0.0217
(0.0710) (0.0288) (0.0168) (0.0129) (0.0239) (0.0425) (0.0312)
Squared age -0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Caste category: SC -0.0270 -0.0290 0.2307 -0.0073 -0.1771 -0.0951 0.0348
(0.5429) (0.1374) (0.1788) (0.0501) (0.2263) (0.1490) (0.2798)
Caste category: OBC/FC 0.1538 -0.0072 0.0273 0.0148 -0.0056 0.0189 0.0972
(0.2966) (0.0949) (0.0972) (0.0740) (0.0773) (0.1288) (0.1397)
Constant -1.1332 0.0144 -0.3915 -0.0526 0.2023 -0.2713 -0.6083
(1.5646) (0.6352) (0.4522) (0.2619) (0.5438) (0.8866) (0.8170)
Ward xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ward linear trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 448 448 448 448 448 448 448
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
is similar to our previous results: the creation of SHGs is not signicant, but their activity
has a positive inuence.
In the columns (2) to (7), we show the results per issue. Once SHGs became active,
WMs are on average 36% more likely to visit an ocer for alcohol and 26% for forest issues.
The impact on school problems is no longer signicant.
284.5.2 Other Groups
We want to examine whether collective actions of SHGs have a similar inuence on the
activities of WMs, when we take into account the creation of Other Groups. The results,
which are given in appendix C, show that the impact of SHGs remains strikingly similar for
both hypotheses.
5 Conclusions
We examine the impact of collective actions undertaken by SHGs on the variety of problems
ward members deal with. We provided a simple model suggesting two hypotheses that we test
and conrm with an empirical study. First, we nd that ward members take care of a larger
variety of ward issues when SHGs undertake collective actions, compared to a situation with
exclusive provision by ward members. Second, ward members begin or increase the provision
of those public goods that SHGs prefer, including the goods that exert a negative externality
on other villagers. Once SHGs became active in the village, local authorities are more likely
to deal with alcohol, forest and school problems. With respect to issues that exert a negative
externality on other villagers, the most controversial and therefore best example is probably
alcohol.
A caveat of our empirical results is that we can focus on the type of public goods only
and not on the quality and the intensity of the work done by the ward member. Knowing
how often each problem appeared, how often the ward member tried to solve it and how
successful he was, would have allowed us to measure the impact of SHGs more precisely.
Unfortunately, it is hard to get this information. Despite this limitation, we believe that our
data set allows us to give some evidence about the positive impact on the political agenda
of collective actions by socially disadvantaged women.
Our results emphasize the need for more research in order to better understand the
motives that lead SHGs to undertaking collective action. We believe that dierent incentives
may simultaneously play a role, like reputation, visibility and altruism. Moreover, it is not
entirely clear whether the phenomena we observe are related or not to the nancial role of
SHGs. We suspect that similar results could be attained by dierent types of groups, which
are not necessarily related to micronance. But in the context of our survey region, in which
the social role of women is limited, intra-household interactions may play an important role.
In this respect, the nancial aim of SHGs can make a dierence by providing a socially
acceptable reason for women to meet regularly.
296 Appendix A: Dierent types of problems
Village infrastructure includes both repair and construction of wells, water pumps, roads, community
buildings, etc.
Closing of alcohol shops / stop brewing alcohol within households In many villages, alcohol con-
sumption is considered a \right" of the husband. Therefore, women do not undertake legal actions,
even in cases of domestic violence or abuse. But even in villages where women are allowed to drink,
the negative eects of excessive alcohol consumption on the family economy and on the family life are
well-known (see for example Mishra (1999)).
Ration shops (pds) A public distribution system was set up to improve food security for the poor and
to ensure availability at aordable prices of wheat, rice, sugar and kerosene. Ration cards entitle
families, belonging to low-income groups, to a particular amount of those goods at a reduced price.
The products are distributed through a network of almost half a million fair price or ration shops
(Gaiha, 2003; and Ministry of Consumer Aairs, Food & Public Distribution, Government of India,
2009).
Ration shop issues include the demand for opening a shop in the village, complaints about the func-
tioning, requests for more control, etc.
School problems The central government launched the National Program of Nutritional Support to Pri-
mary Education (NP-NSPE) to introduce cooked mid-day meals for all children in primary govern-
ment schools, in government aided and local body schools, and since 2002 in Education Guarantee
Scheme (EGS) and in Alternative and Innovative Education scheme (AIE) centers. The aim is to
increase school enrollment and attendance and to simultaneously improve child nutrition. Initially,
the program's objective was to provide children 100 grams of food grains per school day, but in 2004
the nutritional value was revised to 300 calories and 8 to 12 grams of protein and in 2006 to 450
calories, 12 grams of protein and quantities of micronutrients like iron and vitamin A. Next to free
food grains, the scheme also provides central support for the costs of cooking, transportation of food
grains, replacing kitchen devices, evaluation and nally the costs to provide mid-day meals during
the summer vacation in drought aected areas (Government of India, 2009).
Possible problems might be a bad provision or a bad quality of the meals. For example, because
of corruption, money provided for the scheme, or even ingredients might \disappear". Other school
problems include for example complaints about the teacher.
Dowry and child marriage are not common among scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, the main caste
categories in the area where we conducted our survey. Therefore, both problems barely appeared.
Forest issues mainly involve the protection of forest, for example against illegal cutting down of trees to
sell the wood in nearby cities.
Welfare schemes include
 BPL: Below the Poverty Line cards.
30 NREGA: National Rural Employment Guarantee Act cards, which guarantee at least 100 days
of wage employment per nancial year to every household whose adult members volunteer to
do unskilled manual work [implemented: 2005].
 IAY: Indira Awaas Yojana housing scheme, which provides nancial support for building houses
[implemented: 1985/1986, extended in 1999-2000 and 1993-1994].
 IGNOAPS: Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme, which gives nancial aid to citi-
zens above 65 years, who live below the poverty line. This pension scheme includes two other
schemes, namely the Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme (IGNWPS) for BPL wid-
ows and the Indira Gandhi National Disability Pension Scheme (IGNDPS) for BPL persons with
severe or multiple disabilities. In Orissa, there is no age restriction for the last two schemes
[implemented: 1995, extended in 2007].
 NMBS: National Maternity Benet Scheme, which gives BPL pregnant women a one-time pay-
ment of Rs. 500, 8 to 12 weeks before the delivery, for each of the rst two births [implemented:
2001, extended in 2005].
Other issues include relocating a stone crusher machine and closing particular companies.19
7 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. First note that ^ g2 2 [0;Tmax] by construction and does not de-
pend on c. We consider two cases:
(i) Let 2 + (1   2) > 0. Than g2 is increasing and concave in c. It goes to  1 as c
approaches zero and is bounded above by Tmax as c increases. Thus it crosses ^ g2 once from
below at c =
k(2+(1 2))
(1 )(kT 1+(1 1)).
As the marginal cost c increases, the WM provides more and more g2, until the point
~ c =
1+2(1 )




Finally, the curve 1=c crosses ^ g2 from above at c = k
1 (1 1). The proof is completed by
noting that c < ~ c < c when k > k :=
(1+2(1 ))(1 (1 1))
T(1 ) .
(ii) Let 2 + (1   2) < 0. Then g2 is decreasing and convex in c. So c = 0 and ~ c and c
are calculated as in point (i).
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Simple algebra shows that:
^ g1 > g

1 ()
2(1   ) + 
k
>
2(1   ) + 
c(1   )
() c(1   ) > k
19Stone crusher machines fragment stones into small pieces which can be used for construction work. The
use of these machines pollutes the air and causes breathing problems, especially for the elderly.
31(ii) Simple algebra shows that jg
1   ^ g1j < jg
2   ^ g2j if and only if k >
1+2+(1 2)
T
8 Appendix C: Including Other Groups
8.1 Hypothesis 1: Number of issues discussed by the WM
To test whether this hypothesis still holds, we replace Aij in regression (2) by a set of
dummies to compare the activities of WMs operating before any group was created to those
operating after:
 SHG created = 1 if an SHG is created
 SHG active = 1 if an SHG visited an ocer
 Other Group created = 1 if an Other Group is created
 SHG createdOther Group created = 1 if both an SHG and an Other Group are created
 SHG activeOther Group created = 1 if an SHG is active and an Other Group is created
We include the interactions to control for a possible substitution or complementarity eect
between SHGs and Other Groups. We also run the regression above without dierentiating
between creation and rst visit. Aij reduces then to a set of three dummies:
 SHG created = 1 if an SHG is created
 Other Group created = 1 if an Other Group is created
 SHG createdOther Group created = 1 if both an SHG and an Other Group are created
Table 12 shows, per year of election, the percentage of WMs during whose mandate
SHGs and/or Other Groups were present. The number of Other Groups grew steadily over
time. By 2007 all wards had at least one SHG. So, if we take only the creation of SHGs into
account, the dierences between WMs elected in 2002 and 2007 are due to the creation of
Other Groups.
The results are given in Table 13. The impact of SHGs is strikingly similar to what we
found in Table 5, i.e. when we did not take into account Other Groups. Other Groups have a
positive inuence on the WMs activities, but the point estimate is smaller. The negative and
signicant coecient of the dummy SHG activeOther Group created suggests that active
SHGs and Other Groups are - to a certain extent - substitutes.20
20In fact, in column (3) and (4), where we use both the dummies for creation and for being active, the
estimated impact of SHGs is much larger. But the larger coecients of the dummy SHG active are partially
oset by the negative coecients of the interaction term SHG activeOther Group created. In column (1)
32Table 12: Percentage of WMs during whose mandate SHGs and/or Other Groups were present
(by election year)
Elected in
1992 1997 2002 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CREATION OF OTHER GROUPS
Other Groups present (%) 30.1 39.2 46.6 59.6
CREATION OF SHGs VERSUS SHGs BEING ACTIVE
Non-active SHGs present (%) 3.2 30.5 33.3 9.5
Active SHGs present (%) 6.5 19.9 66.7 90.5
Non-active SHGs and Other Groups present (%) 0.0 11.6 13.0 4.8
Active SHGs and Other Groups present (%) 3.2 9.2 33.6 54.8
CREATION OF SHGs
SHG groups present (%) 9.7 50.4 100.0 100.0
SHGs and Other Groups present (%) 3.2 20.8 46.6 59.6
Average number of issues discussed by the WM 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.7
8.2 Hypothesis 2: Extra issues discussed by the WM
To examine which extra issues WMs discuss, we run the regressions described in regression
(3), where we replace Aij by the set of respectively 3 and 5 dummies we introduced in the
previous subsection. The results are given in the tables 14 and 15.
Again, the inuence of SHGs is similar to what we found before (Table 8 and Table 9).
We nd a slightly larger impact for forest issues, but Other Groups have an even larger
impact. This is not surprising, given that most Other Groups are forest committees and
rarely discuss more than one issue (Table 2). In the previous subsection we mentioned that
active SHGs and Other Groups are substitutes. This result seems to be driven by forest
issues.
and (2), where we use only the creation dummy, the interaction term SHG createdOther Group created is
not signicant. From table 12, we learn that only the creation of Other Groups varies between 2002 and
2007. Given that the total number of issues increases by 0.3 (or 30% of the total increase over the time span)
the only variable it can be attributed to is the creation of Other Groups. This might dampen the negative
coecient on the interaction term.
33Table 13: Total number of ward problems addressed by the WMs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SHG created 0.8972*** 0.6796*** 0.1814 0.2303
(0.1377) (0.2118) (0.1615) (0.2044)
SHG active 1.3676*** 1.3740***
(0.1725) (0.2433)
Other Group created 0.7505*** 0.6293** 0.7621*** 0.7212***
(0.2599) (0.2714) (0.2517) (0.2637)
SHG createdOther Group created -0.2182 -0.2693 -0.0808 -0.0617
(0.2584) (0.2634) (0.2965) (0.3012)
SHG activeOther Group created -0.5134* -0.5125*
(0.2745) (0.2773)
Male -0.2925** -0.3063** -0.3082** -0.3218**
(0.1406) (0.1419) (0.1259) (0.1305)
Education level (years) 0.0261 0.0250 0.0230 0.0214
(0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0189) (0.0188)
Land (acres) -0.0403*** -0.0392*** -0.0373*** -0.0370***
(0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0109)
Number of children -0.0084 -0.0099 -0.0052 -0.0082
(0.0348) (0.0336) (0.0348) (0.0340)
Age 0.0036 0.0397 0.0430 0.0513
(0.0362) (0.0360) (0.0303) (0.0315)
Squared age -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Caste category: SC -0.0814 -0.1352 0.0302 -0.0074
(0.2252) (0.2256) (0.2461) (0.2432)
Caste category: OBC/FC 0.0657 0.0716 0.1152 0.1093
(0.1689) (0.1659) (0.1610) (0.1622)
Elected in '97 0.0278 0.0043
(0.1603) (0.1532)
Elected in '02 0.2148 -0.0775
(0.2440) (0.2344)
Elected in '07 0.5707** 0.0828
(0.2528) (0.2544)
Constant 1.2035 0.2432 0.2098 0.0173
(0.8966) (0.8773) (0.7556) (0.7805)
Ward xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 445 445 445 445
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1 34Table 14: Probability, per problem, of WM visiting an ocer (creation only)
Alcohol School Ration Forest Village Welfare
issues issues shop issues infrastructure scheme
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SHG created 0.1134* 0.1143* 0.0121 0.2023*** 0.0424 0.1425
(0.0655) (0.0613) (0.0406) (0.0703) (0.0927) (0.0946)
Other Group created -0.0044 0.1150 0.0243 0.5472*** 0.0576 -0.1542
(0.0927) (0.1047) (0.0548) (0.1089) (0.1130) (0.1244)
SHG createdOther Group created -0.0401 -0.0324 -0.0254 -0.2148** 0.0839 0.0059
(0.0827) (0.0921) (0.0440) (0.0828) (0.0997) (0.1021)
Male -0.1050** -0.0665 0.0082 -0.0500 0.0693 -0.1612***
(0.0424) (0.0449) (0.0283) (0.0422) (0.0538) (0.0508)
Education level (years) 0.0119* -0.0005 -0.0045 -0.0066 0.0089 0.0119
(0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0042) (0.0071) (0.0078) (0.0075)
Land (acres) -0.0092 -0.0098*** -0.0005 -0.0052 -0.0096 -0.0032
(0.0083) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0047)
Number of children -0.0136 0.0083 0.0018 0.0038 -0.0245 0.0098
(0.0090) (0.0100) (0.0074) (0.0111) (0.0181) (0.0145)
Age -0.0024 0.0065 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0144 0.0217*
(0.0127) (0.0092) (0.0067) (0.0096) (0.0156) (0.0126)
Squared age 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Caste category: SC -0.0693 0.0499 0.0205 -0.1612** -0.1045 0.1503
(0.0587) (0.0744) (0.0426) (0.0761) (0.0913) (0.1066)
Caste category: OBC/FC -0.1341** 0.0747 0.0521 -0.0299 -0.0275 0.1655***
(0.0579) (0.0459) (0.0344) (0.0442) (0.0520) (0.0630)
Elected in '97 0.0398 -0.0769* -0.0106 -0.0195 0.0247 0.0595
(0.0368) (0.0463) (0.0249) (0.0445) (0.0779) (0.0701)
Elected in '02 0.0781 -0.0851 0.0269 0.0169 0.0214 0.1730
(0.0674) (0.0670) (0.0427) (0.0759) (0.1052) (0.1064)
Elected in '07 0.0714 0.0902 0.0823** 0.0256 -0.0622 0.3389***
(0.0683) (0.0737) (0.0414) (0.0716) (0.1039) (0.1086)
Constant 0.0837 -0.1524 -0.0497 0.1154 0.3122 -0.0694
(0.3185) (0.2514) (0.1610) (0.2571) (0.3899) (0.3452)
Ward xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 445 445 445 445 445 445
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
35Table 15: Probability, per problem, of WM visiting an ocer (creation vs activity)
Alcohol School Ration Forest Village Welfare
issues issues shop issues infrastructure scheme
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SHG created -0.0435 0.0241 -0.0155 0.0567 0.0646 0.1007
(0.0644) (0.0532) (0.0447) (0.0660) (0.0972) (0.1019)
SHG active 0.3453*** 0.2600*** 0.0695 0.3728*** 0.0440 0.2189*
(0.0822) (0.0856) (0.0464) (0.0810) (0.1199) (0.1145)
Other Group created 0.0239 0.1358 0.0353 0.5573*** 0.0660 -0.1414
(0.0912) (0.1029) (0.0555) (0.1094) (0.1154) (0.1202)
SHG createdOther Group created 0.0546 -0.0044 -0.0442 -0.0318 -0.0026 0.0004
(0.1019) (0.0902) (0.0617) (0.1025) (0.1412) (0.1122)
SHG activeOther Group created -0.1280 -0.0793 -0.0360 -0.3095*** 0.1064 -0.0134
(0.0900) (0.1046) (0.0530) (0.0907) (0.1082) (0.1128)
Male -0.1087*** -0.0706 0.0048 -0.0462 0.0642 -0.1645***
(0.0393) (0.0430) (0.0280) (0.0408) (0.0548) (0.0513)
Education level (years) 0.0104* -0.0011 -0.0044 -0.0088 0.0097 0.0118
(0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0044) (0.0067) (0.0080) (0.0075)
Land (acres) -0.0084 -0.0094*** -0.0004 -0.0043 -0.0099 -0.0031
(0.0076) (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0049)
Number of children -0.0134 0.0088 0.0023 0.0026 -0.0234 0.0103
(0.0087) (0.0096) (0.0074) (0.0109) (0.0183) (0.0145)
Age 0.0015 0.0089 0.0030 0.0029 0.0144 0.0230*
(0.0106) (0.0094) (0.0070) (0.0088) (0.0156) (0.0126)
Squared age 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Caste category: SC -0.0243 0.0753 0.0278 -0.1178 -0.1121 0.1617
(0.0626) (0.0752) (0.0423) (0.0832) (0.0922) (0.1097)
Caste category: OBC/FC -0.1225** 0.0833* 0.0567 -0.0261 -0.0238 0.1708***
(0.0530) (0.0434) (0.0354) (0.0410) (0.0524) (0.0636)
Elected in '97 0.0316 -0.0816* -0.0121 -0.0270 0.0258 0.0573
(0.0339) (0.0462) (0.0248) (0.0406) (0.0777) (0.0709)
Elected in '02 -0.0181 -0.1474** 0.0007 -0.0474 0.0158 0.1392
(0.0638) (0.0656) (0.0398) (0.0685) (0.1111) (0.1122)
Elected in '07 -0.0881 -0.0144 0.0370 -0.0758 -0.0755 0.2813**
(0.0664) (0.0742) (0.0358) (0.0695) (0.1142) (0.1212)
Constant 0.0102 -0.2011 -0.0712 0.0703 0.3049 -0.0965
(0.2718) (0.2540) (0.1663) (0.2366) (0.3904) (0.3451)
Ward xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 445 445 445 445 445 445
Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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